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We analyze the impact of homeownership on unemployment duration using a theoretical model
of job search. Earlier studies suggest that this relationship should be positive because workers
are less mobile when they own a home. Nevertheless, most of the empirical studies in Europe
ﬁnd an opposite relationship. In this paper, we investigate whether this is due to an omission in
the original analysis or whether it is due to an endogeneity problem, i.e. those who can leave
unemployment easily are more likely to be a homeowner. In our empirical analysis, we use
additional information about the differences in unemployment beneﬁts between homeowners and
renters. We ﬁnd that homeowners have higher hazard rates out of unemployment to a job in the
local labour market. The impact is signiﬁcant but not very large. Homeownership has a negative
but insigniﬁcant impact on the hazard to leave unemployment to the non-local labour market.
Finally, we ﬁnd that homeowners would reduce their probability to receive a job offer from the
local labour market when they become renters. The probability to receive a job offer from the
non-local labour market would increase for short spells of unemployment when home owners
become renters. However, this probability would be reduced for long spells of unemployment.
Abstract in Dutch
We analyseren het effect van eigenwoningbezit op de werkloosheidsduur. Hierbij maken we
gebruik van een theoretisch model. Eerdere studies laten zien dat eigenwoningbezit de duur van
werkloosheid zal verlengen. Desondanks vinden de meeste studies dat eigenwoningbezit de kans
op werk voor een werkloze vergroot. In onze studie vinden wij dit laatste resultaat ook, alhoewel
eigenwoningbezit de kans op werk buiten de eigen regio vermindert. Dit effect is echter niet
signiﬁcant. Verder vinden we dat eigenwoningbezitters minder aanbiedingen uit de lokale
arbeidsmarkt zouden krijgen, maar juist meer baanaanbiedingen buiten de eigen regio zouden
ontvangen wanneer zij een woning huren in plaats van kopen. Dit laatste effect neemt af
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56Summary
This paper analyzes the interrelationship between the outcome at the labour and housing market.
We show that the estimation of reduced form models results in an endogeneity problem. With
the absence of valid instruments it is unlikely that reduced form models based on cross-sections
result in the right predictions. We show that the use of multiple durations is necessary but we
also show that reduced form models can only produce sensible results when important
restrictions are met. In particular in order to identify the endogeity bias we need individual
changes in tenure status and these changes should not be due to changes in unobserved labour
market potential. We use data from the Netherlands in the period 1989 to 2001.
We ﬁnd that homeowners have higher hazard rates out of unemployment to a job in the local
labour market. The impact is signiﬁcant but not very large. Homeownership has a negative but
insigniﬁcant impact on the hazard to leave unemployment to the non-local labour market. Our
results suggest that unemployed homeowners start looking for a job primarily on the local labour
market for the in the ﬁrst months of unemployment. Thereafter the focus on the non-local labour
market is increased gradually. Individuals who are homeowners usually receive lower beneﬁts
from social assistance and hence become less selective over time with respect to the offered jobs.
Furthermore, the results show some differences between regions. The impact of homeownership
on the hazard rate to leave unemployment to the local labour market is positive for almost all of
the regions. It is signiﬁcant for 6 out of the 12 regions. We ﬁnd very mixed results for the
non-local labour market. There are many regions in which there is a surprisingly positive impact,
but this impact is never signiﬁcant. The impact is negative for 5 regions and it is signiﬁcant for
the largest region of Zuid-Holland.
Finally, we ﬁnd that homeowners would reduce their probability to receive an acceptable job
offer from the local labour market when they become renters. The probability to receive a job
offer from the non-local labour market would increase for short spells of unemployment when
homeowners become renters. However, this probability would be reduced for long spells of
unemployment.
781 Introduction
The lack of labour mobility is probably one of the main reasons for Europe’s long-term
unemployment and persistent differences of unemployment ﬁgures between different regions
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992). Oswald (1999) argues that homeownership is one of the key
determinants of this lack of mobility. Moreover he points at ﬁve main mechanisms that drive the
positive impact on unemployment. The ﬁrst reason is a direct relationship between mobility and
homeownership in the sense that families who own a home face difﬁculties (and monetary
outlays) selling their home. This implies that even though labour demand is more favorable in
other areas of the country, workers prefer to stay unemployed. The other four reasons can be
described as externalities of homeownership. For example, in the case of an absent renting
market, youngsters face difﬁculties ﬁnding the right residence close to the place where jobs are
situated.
The concern of economists about the relationship described above is in sharp contrast with
the implementation of policies stimulating homeownership. Many European countries including
the Netherlands have used subsidies for low income families to reduce the costs of
homeownership. In addition, interest payments are tax deductible in many European countries,
while there are quite substantial tax payments for buying a home (Belot and Ederveen, 2005).
The simultaneous implementation of policies to subsidize homeownership and increasing the
costs of buying a home has unambiguous negative effects on mobility and hence is likely to have
a positive effect on unemployment ﬁgures.
In a number of studies researchers have focused on the Oswald hypothesis. First, Oswald
(1999) investigates the total impact by comparing different countries with different rates in
homeownership as well as unemployment rates. He ﬁnds a positive impact between
homeownership and the level of unemployment between regions and this is still one of the
strongest evidence in favor of the Oswald hypothesis. However, it does not yield any information
about the relative impact of the different sources. Many researchers tried to disentangle the total
effect of the Oswald hypothesis as outlined in his seminal paper. In this research, the focus is
mainly on the direct effect of homeownership on unemployment status, as reported in Oswald
(1999) as the ﬁrst reason to expect a positive impact between homeownership and regional
unemployment rates. At the moment, there are two approaches in which researchers tried to
investigate this part of the Oswald hypothesis. First, the approach taken by Van den Berg and
Van Vuuren (1998) is indirect in the sense that they investigate the subjective moving costs of the
unemployed. The model they use is a model originally developed in Van den Berg and Gorter
(1997) in which there are two types of jobs. The ﬁrst type of job is close to the present residence
and hence an individual does not have to move for that job. The second type of job is too far
from the present residence and hence it is necessary to move. The method adopted by Van den
Berg and Van Vuuren is to use subjective answers about the reservation wages of the
9respondents. When a homeowner faces substantial moving costs, the difference between
reservation wages should be larger. They ﬁnd that homeowners have substantially higher moving
costs than non-homeowners and hence this implies that homeowners are on average longer
unemployed. A drawback of their analysis is that they cannot estimate the level of the impact of
homeownership on the unemployment rate and can only show that it should be positive. In the
present paper we also show that their approach may yield estimates that are biased downwards,
but that the sign of the estimates cannot be affected.
Another approach is to look at individual unemployment duration data. A drawback of such
an approach is however that the decision to invest in housing is not exogenous and hence the
estimates of homeownership on the unemployment duration are biased. Green and Hendershott
(2001a) try to solve this endogeneity problem by using a two stage estimation method. They ﬁnd
evidence for the positive relationship between unemployment and homeownership supporting
the results of Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (1998). Koning and Van Leuvenstein (2004) use a
similar method as Green and Hendershot, but instead of a two stage estimation process, they use
a full information maximum likelihood approach. Munch et al (2006) apply this method in the
model as developed in Van den Berg and Gorter (1997) and Van den Berg and Van Vuuren
(1998). Koning and Van Leuvensteijn (2004) and Munch et al (2006) ﬁnd a negative relationship
between the unemployment duration and homeownership. An important question is whether this
indicates that the endogeneity problem is not properly dealt with or whether it is due to an
omission of the present literature on the Oswald hypothesis.
An interesting remark on the existing literature is that there is hardly any economic theory
used in the investigation of the relationship between unemployment duration and
homeownership. Although Munch et al (2006) use the theoretical framework of job search as
developed by Gorter and Van den Berg (1997), the choice of homeownership is not modeled and
this implies that the model is partial. The choice between buying and renting is made with the
knowledge of an individual about his expected labour market status in the future. Hence,
individuals that expect (long) spells of unemployment in the future are unlikely to become
homeowners. An aspect that makes this issue even more important is that mortgage banks also
look at the labour market prospects of individuals. It is unlikely that econometric researchers can
obtain as much information as possible to mimic the decision of the individuals and the banks
regarding mortgages. A similar problem arises with job mobility in general.
This paper analyzes the interrelationship between the outcome at the labour and housing
market. We show that the estimation of reduced form models results in an endogeneity problem.
With the absence of valid instruments it is unlikely that reduced form models based on
cross-sections result in the right predictions. We show that the use of multiple durations is
necessary but we also show that reduced form models can only produce sensible results when
important restrictions are met. In particular in order to identify the endogeity bias we need
individual changes in tenure status and these changes should not be due to changes in unobserved
10labour market potential. Finally, we show that structural empirical analysis can be helpful to
identify the endogeneity bias.We use data from the Netherlands in the period 1989 to 2001.
One aspect that is untouched in the present literature is the difference in unemployment
beneﬁt systems between homeowners and renters. In the Netherlands, homeowners cannot
receive social assistance since their total wealth is above the maximum in order to be eligible.1
Notice that this system only moderately affects the investment decision in housing by itself. For
example, if we expect workers to be able to invest in either stocks or in housing, then the choice
between these two assets would not be affected since the tax system looks at the total wealth
instead of its components.2 However, although it has no impact on the total investments on
housing, it has an impact on the behavior of workers once they are already unemployed. All else
equal, unemployed homeowners are less selective in their job search behavior. This results in
different paths of the duration dependence between the individuals.
We use a register based data set of the Netherlands for the period 1989 to 2001. It contains a
random draw from the population of tax payers in the Netherlands (i.e. everyone who is over 15
and receives income from any possible source). Koning and Van Leuvesteijn (2004) also use this
data set (see also Frijters, Lindeboom and Van den Berg, 2000).
Another explanation that has a potential impact on the selection issue concerning
homeownership is the risk of mandatory sales of homeowners when they run out of assets due to
long spells of unemployment. We do not look at this issue in this paper but conjecture that many
of our results do not change by including this aspect. In both situations homeowners receive
extra costs of being long-term unemployed in top of the costs that are also made by the renters.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the Dutch housing and labour
market for the period of analysis. Section 4 investigates the theoretical model. Section 5
describes the data we use for our analysis. In section 6 we set up the empirical analysis and the
results are in section 7. We conclude in section 8
1 This assumes that the mortgages of homeowners are lower than the value of the house. As discussed in the next
section, there is a continuous increase in the housing price in our period of analysis. Hence, this does not seem to be a
very strong assumption.
2 This statement is true for the period of analysis.
11122 The housing and labour market of the Netherlands in the
period 1989 to 2000
Our period of analysis concerns a period in the Netherlands that involved many developments
over time as well as changes in the system in the housing and labour market. We review these
developments in this section.
The Dutch labour market can be described as a market with a high level of unemployment
insurance beneﬁts. The system was changed in two stages in the period of analysis. The original
system was subdivided into three systems depending on the duration of unemployment and
former work experience (OECD, 1997). These systems are called (1) unemployment insurance,
(2) unemployment assistance and (3) social assistance. Individuals who worked at least 26 out of
the last 52 weeks were eligible for unemployment insurance for at least 6 months. After this
period individuals were eligible for an extended period of unemployment insurance if they
worked at least four out of the last ﬁve years prior to the start of the unemployment spell. The
duration of the extended period of unemployment insurance depends on the number of years in
paid employment. Individuals who have only 5 to 10 years of paid employment experience
receive an extended period of 3 months and individuals with over 10 but less than 15 years
receive an extended period of 6 months. For every additional ﬁve years of paid employment the
duration is extended by 6 months with a maximum of 4 years. This implies a total maximum
duration of 4.5 years for individuals with over 40 years of work experience. The level of
unemployment insurance is 70 percent of gross income before the start of the unemployment
spell. After the period of unemployment insurance individuals may be eligible for
unemployment assistance. The eligibility conditions are the same as for the extended period of
unemployment insurance. However, unlike the extended period of unemployment insurance the
duration is always equal to 1 year, with the exception that older workers (i.e. older than 57 years
of age at the moment of the start of the unemployment spell) cannot run out of these beneﬁts at
all. The level of the unemployment assistance beneﬁt is equal to 70 percent of the gross
minimum wage (for example 688 euros in 1995). After the period of unemployment assistance
individuals receive social assistance. The amount is approximately the same as the amount of
unemployment assistance but the eligibility rules are different. For example, individuals who
own wealth over a certain amount (4090 euros in 1993) are not eligible for social assistance. In
addition, the own dwelling is disregarded only up to a certain maximum. If the value of the
house minus the mortgage exceeds this maximum, the recipient of social assistance should use
this money to support his or her own subsistence.
The new system was introduced in 1996. This implies that individuals who started their
unemployment spell after 1996 were treated with the new rules. The main difference between
the new and the old system is that the unemployment assistance system in the Netherlands no
longer exists. This implies that young individuals (i.e. individuals with less than 5 to 10 years of
13paid employment) do not have a long trajectory of non-means tested unemployment beneﬁts. In
addition, unlike the old system, workers older than 57 years of age at the start of the
unemployment spell can run out of non-means tested beneﬁts. In order to compensate for this,
the workers with more than 40 years of work experience at the start of the unemployment spell
receive 5 years instead of 4.5 years of unemployment beneﬁts in the new system.
Dutch unemployment ﬁgures varied a lot in the period of analysis. The unemployment rate
was 7.6 percent in 1989 and then decreased to 6.5 percent in 1991. Thereafter it increased to 8.5
percent in 1994. Since that period there was a sharp decrease in all years of our analysis and it
went down as low as 3.4 percent at the end of 2000.
The period of analysis is a period in which house prices increased without any interruption.
Figure A.1 shows the development of house prices over this period. At the end of the eighties the
average price of a house was around 70 thousand euros while it was 190 thousand euros in the
year 2000. Measured in 1990 euros, we ﬁnd that houseprices roughly doubled over the period of
analysis. At the same time, homeownership increased from around 44 percent in the starting
nineties to 54 percent in 2002 (Belot and Ederveen, 2005). Individuals who buy a house face a
number of taxes and fees that need to be paid. The largest part of this is due to the property
transfer tax which equals six percent over our sample period.3 In addition to this there are notary
and mortgage fees. Note that some of these fees are tax deductible and hence the real costs can
differ from the monetary outlays. Belot and Ederveen (2005) calculate the total costs to be equal
to 9 percent of the purchase of the house, which is average for the OECD countries they consider.
3 The property transfer tax is ofﬁcially 5 percent in the Netherlands, but a temporary supplement was charged from 1979
onwards. This temporary supplement was originally charged to help the government solving the budgetary problems just
after the oil crises, but at present the supplement can be interpreted as permanent. We assume in our empirical analysis
that individuals never anticipated an end of this temporary increase in the property transfer tax. This seems a valid
assumption from the point that the temporary period was already active for 10 years at the start of our sample period.
143 The Oswald hypothesis
In his seminal work, Oswald (1999) states that homeowners should on average face longer
unemployment durations than those who rent their home. We denote Tu as unemployment
duration and x and v are respectively a set of observed and unobserved characteristics. In
addition we denote H as the tenure status. It equals one if tenure status is homeowner and zero
otherwise. Hence, the Oswald hypothesis can be stated as follows
E(Tu|x,v,H = 1) > E(Tu|x,v,H = 0)
a sufﬁcient but not necessary condition for this statement is
Dt ≡ P(Tu ≤t|x,v,H = 1)−P(T ≤t|x,v,H = 0) < 0
for all t > 0. A necessary but not sufﬁcient condition is that Dt < 0 for some t > 0. Empirical
analysts would typically like to know whether Dt is signiﬁcantly smaller than zero for at least
some t > 0. This is a standard evaluation problem as presented in for example Heckman et al.
(1999): it is not possible to receive information of both terms of Dt. At most, we receive only
one outcome for a particular unemployment spell. A possible solution is to compare the
unemployment durations of homeowners with those of the renters. However, such a comparison
is only possible when all relevant characteristics that determine the unemployment durations are
the same. In the next section we argue that this is unlikely to be the case.
15164 The model
4.1 The housing market
In order to invest in housing an individual needs to know the costs as well as the beneﬁts of
housing. We assume that the total outlays for buying a house are equal to K. The direct utility
derived from owning a home is assumed to equal U for homeowners and zero otherwise. We can
interpretU as the direct utility derived from owning a property. It is unlikely that this value is
very high. Instead,U can be also interpreted as the difference between the monthly outlays when
someone is living in a rental house compared to those of the same house when it is bought by the
individual. The difference is usually positive.
4.2 The labour market
The labour market as presented in this paper is a discrete time non-stationary job search model
in the spirit of Van den Berg (1990) and Van den Berg and Gorter (1997). Individuals are in one
of two states: employment and unemployment. We make the assumption that buying a home is
only possible in the state of employment.4 Employed individuals become unemployed with a
layoff probability equal to δ. There are two types of jobs for every individual. These are the jobs
in the local labour market, denoted by L and jobs in the non-local labour market (denoted by N).
As in Van den Berg and Gorter (1997) and Munch et al (2006), we assume that individuals need
to move in order to accept a job in the non-local labour market. Hence, homeowners lose their
homeownership at the moment they accept a job in the non-local labour market. Of course, it is
possible to retain homeownership with a cost equal to K. In case of unemployment individuals
search for a new job. We do not allow for on-the-job search. Individuals receive unemployment
beneﬁts, B at the start of an unemployment spell for a period of T months. After this period,
renters receive unemployment beneﬁts for the remaining spell of unemployment while
homeowners do not receive any unemployment beneﬁts. Individuals discount the future with a
discount rate we denote by ρ.
Unemployed individuals receive job offers with a probability equal to λ in each period.
Conditional on a job offer the probability that the offer comes from the local labour market
equals p. Every job offer is also a wage offer with wages sampled from the wage offer
distribution F.5 When a job offer is received, the individual has to decide whether he accepts the
4 As turns out in the analysis, this assumption is not restrictive. It can be shown that renters never buy a home at the
moment they become unemployed, while homeowners never buy a new home. The only possible restriction is with
respect to entrants to the labour market.
5 Contrary to Van den Berg and Gorter (1997), the wage offer distribution is not dependent on the location of the job.
Their analysis is more general and in many situations our framework may even not be valid.
17job or rejects it and searches for better alternatives. It is not possible to recall a job offer that is
already rejected. In the present case with non-stationarity of the unemployment beneﬁts, this
assumption is essential for the analysis. It makes individuals who did not yet run out of
unemployment beneﬁts also less selective because of the anticipation of the date of
unemployment beneﬁts exhaustion.
We denote the value of unemployment for an individual who is unemployed for t months by
VU
t (H). Using the standard Bellman techniques the value for an individual who is employed






Given the fact that individuals are not able to search on the job and given the fact that the










An important aspect concerning (4.2) is that both the left- and the right-hand side are
independent of the employment states of the individual (i.e. it does not contain the wage of the
individual). It implies that the preference of housing tenure is constant over time. Hence, an
individual who presently owns a home will always choose to buy a new home once he or she
accepted a job in the non-local labour market. The value of an unemployed worker who has been
unemployed for t months is equal to
(1+ρ)VU
t (H) =VU




















We deﬁne the reservation wage at the local labour market, ϕL
t (H) of an individual in months t








From this, we obtain
ϕN
t (H) = ϕL
t (H)+(ρ +δ)HK (4.4)
18For renters we obtain the following reservation wage:
ϕ(0) ≡ ϕL
t (0) = ϕN







where F = 1−F. This formula is also obtained by Munch et al (2006). Next, for homeowners
who receive unemployment beneﬁts (i.e. t < T) we have
(1+ρ)ϕL

























The following general proposition can be derived.
Proposition 1. For all t > 0 we have ϕL
t+1(1) ≤ ϕL
t (1) where the inequality is strict for t ≤ T
and the inequality becomes an equality otherwise.
Proof: See appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 implies that the reservation wage path is strictly decreasing for individuals who
own a home up till the moment that they run out of unemployment beneﬁts. After this period the
reservation wage remains constant.
Proposition 2. For K > 0, ρ > 0, and t ∈ N it holds (i) ϕL
t (1) < ϕ(0), (ii) ∂ϕL
t (1)/∂K < 0, (iii)
∂ϕL
t (1)/∂K < ∂ϕL
t+1(1)/∂K, when t ≤ T and ∂ϕL
t (1)/∂K = ∂ϕL
t+1(1)/∂K otherwise.
Proof: See appendix A.2.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 states that homeowners are always less selective in the local labour
market than renters. The second part states that the reservation wage of homeowners in the local
labour market decreases with the moving costs. Finally, the third part states that this is more
important the shorter the unemployment duration.
A typical reservation wage path of individuals is illustrated in Figure A.2. As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, unlike the results of Munch et al (2006), it is no longer the case that
homeowners always have a higher reservation wage in the non-local labour market. When the
level of the unemployment beneﬁts is high and/or T is small it might even be possible that the
reservation wage path in the non-local labour market of homeowners starts already at a lower
level. However, unlike the path in Figure A.2, it is also possible that the complete path of
homeowners in the non-local labour market is above the reservation wage of renters.
19Next, we look at the decision to buy a home. Let U∗ be the minimum level forU that a



















Using proposition (2), we conclude that both parts are larger than zero.
We are able to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Individuals are more likely to become homeowners when
1. U is larger.
2. K is smaller.
3. δ is smaller.
4. p is larger.
5. ρ is smaller.
For (3) we need that F(x) is log-concave, when T → ¥.
Proof: See appendix A.3. 
Proposition 3-1 indicates that individuals who have a higher preference for homeownership are
more likely to buy a house. Proposition 3-2 shows that when the costs are higher,
homeownership is less likely. Propositions 3-3 shows that the higher the likelihood to become
unemployed, the lower the likelihood to own a home. This is the endogeneity problem as
indicated in the introduction. Proposition 3-4 states that individuals are more likely to become
homeowners when there are more opportunities in the local labour market, compared to the
non-local labour market. Finally, as stated by 3-5, the discount rate has a negative impact on the
likelihood that individuals own a home. This is intuitive since the costs of becoming homeowner
proceed the beneﬁts.
Unfortunately, we are not able to prove that the overall labour market opportunities have a
monotonic impact on the likelihood that individuals own a home. When T → ¥ and with
log-concavity of F, then it is possible to show thatU∗ increases with λ. Hence the overall labour
market opportunities make individuals less likely to become homeowner. However, for the more
plausible case that T is small and for large enough levels of B, we are able to show the opposite.
When individuals are compared with respect to unemployment duration and tenure situation,
then it is likely that homeowners with good economic prospects are compared with renters who
do not have as favorable economic prospects. Hence, unless someone is able to ﬁnd an
20instrument that solves this problem, it is unlikely that a reduced form approach estimates the
right relationship between unemployment duration and homeownership.
We perform a simulation exercise in order to gain insight into this mechanism. For this
exercise we assume that wage offers follow a log-normal distribution, with parameters µ and σ.
We assume µ to be equal to 7.2 and σ is assumed to be 0.3. The values of p and δ are equal to
0.5 and 0.02 in the baseline simulation. The number of months for unemployment insurance is
taken as 24 months. The discount rate is equal to 0.01 and unemployment beneﬁts equal 1200.
The costs of buying a house are assumed to equal 10,000. For our analysis we vary λ from 0.01
to 0.2. Figure A.3 shows the results of this exercise. As we see, for these parameter values, the
relationship betweenU∗ and λ is negative and large. Note that it is also realistic to assume that
there is a negative relationship between λ and δ, and this assumption makes the endogeneity
problem even more stringent.
4.3 The duration in unemployment
We denote TL(H) as the duration to ﬁnd a job in the local labour market and TN(H) as the
duration to ﬁnd a job in the non-local labour market. In order to determine the distributions of TL
and TN, we ﬁrst determine the probability to leave unemployment in period t. We denote this by
θL,t(H) for the local labour market and θN,t(H) for the non-local labour market.6 These
probabilities equal
θL(0) = λ pF(ϕ(0))
and
θN(0) = λ(1− p)F(ϕ(0))
for renters, while it equals
θL,t(1) = λ pF(ϕL
t (1))
and
θN,t(1) = λ(1− p)F(ϕN
t (1))
for homeowners.
Hence, when individuals are homogeneous, the duration distributions can be easily derived.
From the previous subsection, it is not difﬁcult to see that the distribution TL,t(1) is ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominated by TL(0), while it is not possible to make an a-priori statement about
the relationship between TN,t(1) and TN(0). However, when T → ¥ we are able to show that
6 In line with continuous duration analysis, we denote these probabilities by hazard rates for the remainder of the paper.
21TN,t(1) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates TN(0). The (ﬁrst part of the) Oswald hypothesis
states that homeowners leave unemployment slower than renters. In order to investigate whether
this also holds in the present theoretical framework we introduce the probabilities to leave
unemployment to either the local or the non-local labour market. We denote these as θ(0) for
renters and θt(1) for homeowners. These probabilities are the sum of the probabilities
introduced above. In line with the discussion above, it should not come as a surprise that it is not
possible to make general statements about comparisons between the two hazard rates. However,
this changes when we make the assumption as in Munch et al (2006) that homeowners do not
run out of unemployment insurance.
Proposition 4. Suppose that F(x) is log-concave for x > 0. When T → ¥, we have that
θt(1) < θ(0), t > 0.
Proof: See appendix A.4. 
Many of the well-known distributions in labour economics have the property that F(x) is log
concave (Mortensen, 1986 and Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 1989). Among these are the normal,
log-normal and the Pareto distribution.7
The proposition states that in the case of no unemployment insurance exhaustion, workers
ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to leave unemployment when they are homeowner. Hence, in order to ﬁnd
perverse effects, we need the additional framework of unemployment beneﬁts exhaustion. Note
that this implies that the framework of Munch et al (2006) cannot explain these perverse effects.
These conclusions are based on the assumption that individuals are homogeneous. In a panel
data setup, it is possible to defend such an assumption by using more than 1 observation for the
same individual. However, such an assumption is hard to defend in cross-sections. In the
remainder of this section we focus on differences in the population in the univariate case, i.e.
only one variable is allowed to differ over the population. We focus on the impact of the
probability to lose a job, but the impact of the other parameters can be calculated in a similar
fashion. For renters, the probability that an individual ﬁnds a job in the local labour market can
be calculated as follows
P(TL(0) =t|H = 0) =
R ¥
0 1(U <U∗)λ pF(ϕL(0))(1−λ pF(ϕL(0)))t−1dGδ(y)
R ¥
0 1(U <U∗)dGδ(y)
The interpretation of this equation is that the probability to ﬁnd a job in the local labour market
is weighted by the density of δ conditional on the event that the individual is a renter. Using
Proposition 3, we know that renters have higher levels of δ. This implies that 1(U <U∗) equals
7 However, as this condition is too restrictive for some distribution (Van den Berg, 1994). From the outset of the proof it
can be shown that the condition of log-concavity is much too strong. It is not in the scope of this paper to prove more
general results.
22zero for low levels and 1 for higher levels. In addition, the reservation wage decreases in δ and
hence for small levels of t we ﬁnd higher values of P(TL(0) =t|H = 0) than in the homogeneous
case. This is the same as saying that the unobserved heterogeneity case is stochastically
dominated by the homogeneous case. This implies that the hazard rate for renters is
overestimated when we would not correct for the unobserved heterogeneity in the empirical
estimation. In addition, it can be shown that the hazard rate for homeowners is underestimated.
This result is not dependent on the focus on the local labour market. The same results apply for
the non-local labour market.
Table 4.1 shows the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the hazard rate for the other
parameters when T → ¥. The hazard rate is not affected by unobserved heterogeneity inU.
When we assume that T → ¥, we know from the discussion above that the individuals with
lower levels of λ become homeowners while those with high levels of λ become renters. Hence,
λF(ϕL(0)) is larger for renters than for homeowners would they be renters.8 This implies that
the hazard rate for renters is overestimated by this impact. For unobserved heterogeneity in p we
know that renters have lower levels of p than homeowners. However, this does not have any
impact on their total hazard rate since any underestimation in the hazard rate of the local labour
market cancels with the overestimation in the non-local labour market. This does not happen for
the homeowners since they have different levels of the reservation wage for the local and
non-local labour market.
Table 4.1 The impact of unobserved heterogeneity when T → ¥ on the hazard rate to leave unemployment.
U K λ δ p
Hazard rate of renters 0 0 + + 0
Hazard rate of homeowners (local) 0 - - - +
Hazard rate of homeowners (non-local) 0 + - - -
What happens when we assume that unemployment beneﬁts exhaust after T < ¥ periods? This
may have an impact on the relationship between the level of λ and the tenure status. Now, it is
possible that we obtain the opposite signs, i.e. the hazard rate of renters is underestimated, while
the hazard rate of homeowners is overestimated.
When more than one parameter is not observed, the same techniques can be used as above
using multidimensional integrals. This makes the analysis quite difﬁcult and virtually every
relationship can be explained by the correlation between the different components. For example,
when we assume a negative correlation between λ and δ, then even in the case that T → ¥, the
exit rate of homeowners may be overestimated. This can be seen intuitively by the fact that the
low level of δ of homeowners makes them more likely to have high levels of λ. This counteracts
8 This is again based on the assumption that F is log concave.
23the overestimation we obtained from the direct impact of λ on the likelihood of owning a home.
Hence, the correlation between the unobserved components of these two parameters is important
and therefore we pay a lot of attention to this type of correlation in the empirical analysis.
245 The Data
We use a Dutch data set known as the Income Panel Register Database. This database is
gathered from the registers of the tax ofﬁce and stored at Statistics Netherlands for statistical
research. Virtually any question asked to individuals who are in the payroll tax system is
included in the data set. In addition, some information not ﬁlled in by the respondents but known
by the tax ofﬁcer is also in the data set. The period that is available ranges from January, 1st 1989
to December, 31st 2000.
For our analysis we use only a part of the total data set. It is set up as follows: from the total
data set Statistics Netherlands draws a sample of register numbers. The size of the sample is
around 75,000 and this is approximately equal to 1 percent of the Dutch labour force. Together
with the individuals drawn directly from this data set, Statistics Netherlands adds those
individuals who are in the same household. Hence, individuals in large households are
oversampled. The total size of the dataset is approximately 270,000 individuals for each year.
Individuals have to ﬁll in their income and the source of income they earned as well as the
start and end of the period in which they earned this type of income. In this setup, individuals
who earned a particular type of income the whole year have a start date equal to January, 1st and
an end date equal to December, 31st. We match the different years in order to derive the
employment and unemployment spells. It is important to realize that unemployment is not a
source of income but a state in the labour market, being unimportant for the tax ofﬁce. Hence,
there is more than one income source that matches with the state of unemployment. This implies
that individuals report transitions even though for our analysis nothing happens. In those cases,
we take this as an ongoing spell. Related to this, many individuals report very small breaks in
their unemployment beneﬁts collection, after which they continue receiving these beneﬁts. This
is particularly the case at the start and end of every calendar year. We take these spells as
ongoing whenever the period in which no unemployment beneﬁts were collected is no longer
than 3 weeks. A ﬁnal problem with the construction of the unemployment spells is that relatively
many individuals report January, 1st as the start of their collection period and December, 31st as
their last day of collection of beneﬁts after which they report no further collection of beneﬁts in
the next year. Most likely, these individuals found their job already before the end of the year but
since they were not able to reconstruct the exact date at which they started their new job, they
just report the end of the year as end date of the collection of beneﬁts.
We use the ﬁrst 10 unemployment and employment spells of individuals over the period 1989
to 2000. We exclude the spells of individuals who were reported to be a child of or raised by the
head of the household at the start of the unemployment duration. These individuals are usually
in a different situation than the population of individuals that we tend to describe by the model.
The number of unemployment spells are reported in Table A.1. In total we have around 20,000
individuals with at least one unemployment spell and as can be seen from the table there is a
25substantial amount of recidivists in our data set. The average age of our sample is around 38
years and it increases when we look at individuals who have multiple spells. The percentage of
females is somewhat over 40 percent for the ﬁrst unemployment duration and drops for the later
unemployment durations. Almost half of the observations in the ﬁrst unemployment spell are
from individuals who are head of the household. It increases for the later unemployment spells.
There is no clear pattern for the other two types of positions within the household. The variables
for employment type (i.e. civil servant, employed in the business sector and self employed)
indicate whether individuals were ever employed in this sector. This deﬁnition is convenient
since it abstracts from the problem that individuals in the registers do not have any employment
type whenever they are unemployed. We distinguish between the 12 different regions in the
Netherlands. Table A.2 reports the same descriptive statistics for the employment spells. There
are almost 200,000 individuals with at least one unemployment spell. In general, individuals in
employment spells are younger, more likely to be single and more likely to be observed self
employed over the sample period.
We deﬁne a transition to the local labour market when it is within the COROP area in the
Netherlands. These are areas that divide the Netherlands into 40 different regions that are
economically related.
Table A.3 lists the unemployment durations as well as the number of individuals with at least
one unemployment spell. In general the unemployment spell decreases with the number of
unemployment spells that someone already experienced. Although there are some exceptions,
the unemployment spells are shorter for the individuals that are homeowners.
266 Empirical implementation
6.1 Single spell reduced form duration model
This section discusses a single spell reduced form model in the spirit of Munch, et al. (2003).
The analysis is based on the joint distribution of homeownership versus renting and the
distribution of unemployment spells. As in the previous sections, we denote H for the status at
the housing market. In addition we use T = min(TL,TN,TO) for the unemployment duration,
where TL is the unemployment duration that terminates due to a transition to the local labour
market and TN is an unemployment duration that terminates due to a transition to the non-local
labour market. TO is the time till exit to non-participation. The vector x is used for the set of
characteristics that have an impact on the decision to become homeowner whereas x1 is used for
the set of characteristics that have an impact on the unemployment duration (excluding
homeownership). The set of variables included in x1 is a subset of the variables included in x.
The variableV contains the unobserved time-independent characteristics related with the
outcome vector (H,T). The dimension of this variable is equal to 4 and we denoteVi;i = 0,1,2,3
for the scalars of unobserved heterogeneity related to (1) the housing decision, (2) the duration
of an unemployment spell that terminates to a transition to the local labour market, (3) the
duration of an unemployment spell that terminates to a transition to the non-local labour market,
(4) the duration of an unemployment spell that terminates into non-participation. The
distribution ofV is denoted by G.
We model the housing decision as a probit model. This implies that the time dependent
individual characteristics that inﬂuence the housing decision are assumed to be drawn from a
standard normal distribution that is independent fromV. We denote H∗ for the nuisance
parameter with H = 1 if H > 0 and zero otherwise. We specify this parameter as
H∗ = xβ0+v0+u with u ∼ N(0,1). The unemployment duration T is modeled as a competing
risks model (Lancaster, 1990). We denote the hazard rates out of unemployment to employment
in the local and non-local labour market by θL and θN. We use the following mixed proportional
hazards speciﬁcation for the local labour market
θL(H,x1,t,v1) = exp(ξ(H,x1,γ1)+x1β1)ψL(t,H)v1
where β1 is a vector of coefﬁcients that corresponds to the set of characteristics x1. The vector γ1
measures the impact of homeownership on the outﬂow out of unemployment to the local labour
market. The function ξ represents the interdependence between x1 and H. In particular we allow
the relationship between unemployment duration and homeownership to be dependent on
regional characteristics. The function ψL is the baseline hazard. We allow homeowners to have
different baseline hazards. The main reason for this more ﬂexible speciﬁcation is related with the
difference in unemployment beneﬁts collection of the homeowners as discussed in the previous
27sections. Note that this additional interdependence has as a drawback that the model is no longer
non-parametrically identiﬁed (Van den Berg, 2002). Essentially, this implies that our
identiﬁcation comes from the parametric assumptions concerning the baseline hazard and the
unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In our opinion this drawback is not outweighted by the
fact that we know from economic theory that this type of interdependence should exist. We use a
piecewise constant baseline hazard function for our analysis. A similar representation for the
non-local labour market is assumed
θN(x1,t,v2) = exp(ξ(H,x1,γ2)+x1β2)ψN(t,H)v2
where β2 is a vector of coefﬁcients and the function ψN is the baseline hazard for this market.
Finally, the hazard rate for the transition from unemployment to non-participation is speciﬁed as
follows
θO(x1,t,v3) = exp(ξ(H,x1,γ3)+x1β3)ψO(t)v3
For individuals that had no terminating unemployment spells at the end of December, the


























where d2 is equal to one if the individual transits to a job in the local labour market and zero if
the transit is to the non-local labour market. The variable d3 indicates right censoring. The
variable d4 denotes a transit into non-participation.
As we stated in the data section there are relatively many individuals with unemployment
spells that terminate at the end of the year. It is unlikely that these individuals really ﬁnd a job in
that period. Instead of taking the reported unemployment spell and use the conditional likelihood
contributions as we described above, we assume that these individuals ended their spells at some
stage over the year. We correct the likelihood contributions for these individuals accordingly.
For the parameterization of the model, we use a two point distribution for the unobserved
heterogeneity terms (as in Munch et al, 2003). Hence, the joint distribution ofV has 16 mass
points. For the identiﬁcation of the model we do not include a constant into x and x1 and we
restrict the baseline hazards to equal one in the ﬁrst period. These restrictions are sufﬁcient for
identiﬁcation and hence the estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. This implies
that the mean of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution can be interpreted in the same way as
the constant term in regression analysis.
28In order to omit problems with left censoring, we ignore unemployment spells that are ongoing
at the moment individuals ﬁrst enter the panel. Although these spells have a likelihood
contribution that can be calculated from the analysis in Ridder (1984), the assumptions
underlying these calculations are restrictive.
Since we are not interested in the transition process from unemployment to
non-participation, this process only enters the estimation method through the dependence of v3
with vi;i = 0,1,2. When we make the assumption that v3 is independent with the other
unobserved components, then a transition to non-participation can be interpreted as
right-censoring (Lancaster, 1990). As discussed in Frijters and Van der Klaauw (2005), the
assumption that v3 is unrelated with the other unobserved components is not always valid.
6.2 Multiple spell duration models
Including multiple spells has the advantage that some of the identifying assumptions related to
the single spell duration models no longer hold. Especially, the restriction that x and t need to be
proportional, is no longer necessary (see Honore, 1993 and Van den Berg, 2001). Unfortunately
it also complicates the analysis. We denote the duration in a job as TE. The transition from a job
into unemployment is modelled using a mixed proportional hazard model, where we specify the
hazard rate as
θE(x1,t,v4) = exp(ξ(H,x1,γ4)+x1β4)ψE(t)v4
where v4 is the unobserved heterogeneity x1 is the same as in the previous subsection and the
vectors β4 and γ4 are vectors of coefﬁcients.
Deﬁne LU
iju as the likelihood contribution of individual i for unemployment spell ju. This
contribution is the same as Li as deﬁned in the previous subsection. In addition, LE
iju is deﬁned as
the likelihood contribution of individual i for employment spell je. The total likelihood












with Mu and Me the number of unemployment and employment spells. The method discussed
above is rather difﬁcult. The solution adopted in previous studies to reduce its complexity is to
assume that v4 is independent of the other unobserved components. In that case we can just omit
the employment durations from the estimation procedure. The assumption of independence
implies that individuals who have difﬁculties ﬁnding a job (low levels of v1 and v2) face the same
probabilities of keeping their job as individuals with high probabilities of ﬁnding a job. This may
not be a valid assumption, since many individuals with low abilities face both high probabilities
of becoming unemployed as well as low probabilities of leaving unemployment. In addition, as
we concluded from our theoretical analysis, the selection issue is highly dependent on the
29question whether v4 is negatively correlated with v1 and v2. Therefore, in contrast to previous
studies we do not make the assumption that v4 is independent of the other unobserved
components.
We are able to solve the problem of endogeneity when there is variation in the tenure status
and when the assumption that v0, v1, v2 and v4 are constant is valid. However, the question arises
why individuals change their tenure status when their unobserved labour market potential and
their unobserved taste for being a homeowner do not change. A potential explanation for this
variation is the change in the age of the individual affecting both the taste for homeownership as
well as labour market potential. In this way, we are able to estimate Dt as discussed in Section 3.
307 Results
We estimated our reduced form model for the ﬁrst 10 unemployment and employment spells as
described in the previous section. We do not estimate the hazard of leaving unemployment to
non-participation. Table A.4 lists the results of this exercise. The ﬁgures are measured in terms
of the monthly hazard rates. We ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant impact of the fraction of
homeownership on the likelihood that someone is a homeowner. The presence of children has a
small negative impact on the likelihood to own a home, while being female increases this
likelihood. Individuals who received a scholarship for higher education in the period of analysis
have a higher likelihood to own a home. In addition, we ﬁnd that age does not have an important
impact on the decision whether an individual owns a home. The single exception is the youngest
age group having a much smaller probability to own a house. Single individuals as well as heads
of households are less likely to own a home. In addition, individuals who were ever working in
the private sector or working as a self employed have a high likelihood to own a house. Note that
the baseline here contains individuals who were managers or individuals who never stated to be
self employed or working in either the private or public sector. There are some differences
between regions, but it is not related to urbanization in these different regions.
We ﬁnd that homeowners have higher hazard rates out of unemployment to a job in the local
labour market. The impact is signiﬁcant but not very large. The presence of children in the
household has a positive impact while being female has a negative impact on the hazard rate for
a job in the local labour market. Whether an individual received a scholarship from higher
education has virtually no impact on the hazard rate in the local labour market. This hazard rate
decreases with the age of an individual. Singles and heads of households have a lower hazard to
leave unemployment for the local labour market, while individuals who ever worked in the
private sector have a higher hazard rate. Again, there are some differences between the regions.
Homeownership has a negative but insigniﬁcant impact on the hazard to leave unemployment
to the non-local labour market. Note that although the point estimate is about the same in
absolute values compared to the point estimate we found for the local labour market, the
comparison between these two estimates is somewhat difﬁcult. This is related to the fact that the
levels of unobserved heterogeneity components also differ (as can be seen from the last row of
Table A.4). Both the presence of children as well as being female has a positive impact on the
hazard to leave unemployment to the non-local labour market. Both results are somewhat
surprising and not in line with the results of Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (1998) who ﬁnd that
females face higher non-monetary costs of moving to a new residence. Older individuals have
lower hazard rates for leaving unemployment to the non-local labour market. In addition,
spouses of heads of households have a lower hazard rate to leave unemployment to the non-local
labour market. This is in line with the results of Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (1998).
Individuals who stated that they worked in the private sector have a low hazard to leave
31unemployment to the non-local labour market. To a smaller extend this is also true for civil
servants and self employed.
The baseline hazards out of unemployment to the local and non-local labour market have the
same shape. They both increase in the ﬁrst year and then decrease in the later quarters.
Remember that this is the period at which for most of the individuals the unemployment
insurance beneﬁts are terminated. After this period, individuals receive social assistance. The
increase is higher for the non-local labour market which suggests that unemployed workers start
looking for a job primarily on the local labour market for the ﬁrst months of the unemployment
spells. Thereafter the focus on the non-local labour market is increased gradually. The baseline
hazard ﬂuctuates much more over time for homeowners than for renters. This is exactly the
mechanism as described during the previous sections. Individuals who are homeowners usually
receive lower beneﬁts from social assistance and hence become less selective with respect to the
offered jobs.
The impact of homeownership on the hazard to leave employment is negative and very
signiﬁcant. This is in line with previous results found in Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004).
Both the presence of children as well as being female has a positive impact on the hazard to leave
employment. Individuals in between 30 and 40 have the lowest hazard to leave employment
while the highest hazard is found for the oldest age group. Heads of households have a very
small hazard to leave employment, while the largest hazard is found for partners. Surprisingly
we do not ﬁnd any impact of the employment types on the hazard to leave employment.
The correlation coefﬁcients for the components of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution
are summarized in Table A.5. We ﬁnd virtually no correlation in the unobserved components of
homeownership and the hazard to leave unemployment through the local labour market (i.e. Dt
as in Section 3). On the contrary there is a positive but insigniﬁcant relationship between the
unobservable components that result in a high likelihood to become homeowner and the hazard
to leave unemployment through the non-local labour market. The unobservables between the
likelihood to become homeowner and the hazard rate to leave employment are negatively
correlated. Again the correlation does not differ signiﬁcantly from zero. Not surprisingly, there
is a large positive correlation between the unobservables of the hazard rate to leave
unemployment to the local and the non-local labour market. The correlations between the
unobservables to leave unemployment to either the local or the non-local labour market with the
unobservables to leave employment are both negative. Although not that surprising, as stated in
the theory section, this has an important implication on the interpretation of the results.
We estimated a second model speciﬁcation in order to check the robustness of our results. In
the second speciﬁcation, we estimate the impact of homeownership on the hazard rate of leaving
unemployment taking account of the different regions in the Netherlands. The results of this
speciﬁcation are not radically different from the previous exercise. However, we ﬁnd some
differences between the different regions. The impact of homeownership on the hazard rate to
32leave unemployment to the local labour market is positive for almost all of the regions. It is
signiﬁcant for 6 out of the 12 regions. We ﬁnd very mixed results for the non-local labour
market. There are many regions in which there is a surprisingly positive impact, but this impact
is never signiﬁcant. The impact is negative for 5 regions and it is signiﬁcant for the largest region
of Zuid-Holland.
In order to increase the insight in our results we calculate the counterfactual probabilities of
leaving unemployment for the two states. Denote e h as the (counterfactual) tenure state of an
individual. This variable is equal to one if we consider the individual to be homeowner and zero
otherwise. The probability that an individual observed and considered to be home owner has to
wait for an acceptable job offer from the local labour market equals
P(TL ≤t|x;H = 1;e h = 1) = å
v0,v1,v2,v4
P(TL ≤t|x;e h = 1;V0 = v0;V1 = v1;V2 = v2;V4 = v4)
×
P(H = 1|V0 = v0)P(V0 = v0;V1 = v1;V2 = v2;V4 = v4)
P(H = 1)
The counterfactual distribution of receiving an acceptable job offer from the local labour market
of someone being observed homeowner when he would no longer own a house equals
P(TL ≤t|x;H = 1;e h = 0) = å
v0,v1,v2,v4
P(TL ≤t|x;e h = 0;V0 = v0;V1 = v1;V2 = v2V4 = v4)
×
P(H = 1|V0 = v0)P(V0 = v0;V1 = v1;V2 = v2;V4 = v4))
P(H = 1)
Hence, the difference between the two equations is the net effect of owning a house on the
arrival rate of acceptable job offers from the local labour market (i.e. Dt as in Section 3) . Using
these techniques it is also possible to ﬁnd the same difference for the non-local labour market.
The actual and counterfactual distributions can also be calculated using exactly the same
method, but changing H = 1 into H = 0 in the equations above. Finally, the probability to
receive an acceptable offer can be calculated using:
P(T ≤t|x;,H = 1;e h = 1) =1−





1−P(TN ≤t|x;,H = 1;e h = 1)

The results of these simulations are in ﬁgures A.4 to A.7. We ﬁnd that homeowners reduce their
probability to receive a job offer from the local labour market for any month of unemployment
duration when they would become renters. On the contrary, the probability to receive a job offer
from the non-local labour market increases for low levels of the unemployment duration. This
probability reduces for higher levels of unemployment duration. The pictures for the renters are
not much different from the mirror image of those of the homeowners.
33348 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the impact of homeownership on unemployment duration using a
theoretical model of job search. Previous analysis suggests that this relationship should be
positive because workers are less mobile when they own a home. Nevertheless, in much of the
empirical work in Europe an opposite relationship is found. In this paper, we argued that this
negative relationship is a classical endogeneity problem which is originated from the
expectations of individual workers about their future labour market status. We concluded that the
use of multiple spells can be an essential element to solve the endogeneity problem but the
necessary assumptions are still restrictive and not very likely to hold in practice. One way to
solve this is the estimation of a structural model. In particular, the estimation of such a model
can help the identiﬁcation using the different predictions with respect to the outﬂow rate of
individuals.
We found that homeowners have higher hazard rates out of unemployment to a job in the
local labour market. The impact is signiﬁcant but not very large. Homeownership has a negative
but insigniﬁcant impact on the hazard to leave unemployment to the non-local labour market.
Our results suggest that unemployed workers start looking for a job primarily on the local labour
market in the ﬁrst months of unemployment. Thereafter the focus on the non-local labour market
is increased gradually. Individuals who are homeowners usually receive lower beneﬁts from
social assistance and hence become less selective over time with respect to the offered jobs.
Furthermore, the results show some differences between regions. The impact of
homeownership on the hazard rate to leave unemployment to the local labour market is positive
for almost all of the regions. It is signiﬁcant for 6 out of the 12 regions. We ﬁnd very mixed
results for the non-local labour market. There are many regions in which there is a surprisingly
positive impact, but this impact is never signiﬁcant. The impact is negative for 5 regions and it is
signiﬁcant for the largest region of Zuid-Holland.
Finally, we ﬁnd that homeowners would reduce their probability to receive a job offer from
the local labour market when they become renters. The probability to receive a job offer from the
non-local labour market would increase for short spells of unemployment when home owners
become renters. However, this probability would be reduced for long spells of unemployment.
3536References
Belot, M. and S. Ederveen, 2005, Indicators of cultural and institutional barriers in OECD
countries, CPB Research Memorandum, The Hague.
Blanchard, O.J. and L.R. Katz, 1992, Regional evolutions, Brookings papers on economic
activity, 1–75.
Frijters, P. and B. van der Klaauw, 2006, Job search and non participation, Economic Journal
116, 895–936.
Green, R. and P. Hendershott, 2001, Home ownership and the duration of unemployment: a test
of the Oswald hypothesis, Working Paper, Aberdeen University.
Honoré, B., 1993, Identiﬁcation results for duration models with multiple spells, Review of
Economic Studies 60, 241–246.
Lancaster, 1990, The econometric analysis of transition data, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Munch, J.R., M. Rosholm and M. Svarer, 2006, Are home owners really more unemployed,
Economic Journal 116, 911–1013.
OECD, 1997, Making Work Pay, OECD, Paris.
Oswald, A. J., 1999, The housing market and Europe’s unemployment: a non-technical paper,
Warwick University, Warwick.
Ridder, G., 1984, The distribution of single-spell duration data, in: G.R. Neuman and N.C.
Westergård-Nielsen, Studies in labour market dynamics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Van den Berg, G.J.,1990, Nonstationarity in job search theory, Review of Economic Studies 57,
255–277.
Van den Berg, G.J., 1992, A structural dynamic analysis of job turnover and the costs associated
with moving to another job, Economic Journal 102, 1116–1133.
Van den Berg, G.J. and C. Gorter, 1997, Job search and commuting time, Journal of Business
37and Economic Statistics 15, 269–281.
Van den Berg, G.J. and A.P. van Vuuren, 1998, Job search and the non-monetary costs with
moving to a new residence, Working Paper, Free University Amsterdam.
Van Leuvensteijn, M. and P. Koning, 2004, The effect of home-ownership on labour mobility in
the Netherlands, Journal of Urban Economics 55, 580-596.
38Appendix A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 1










































































Where we use F(x) ≤ 1. This proves the proposition. 
A.2 Proof of proposition 2















































































which is contrary to our assumption. Together with proposition (1) this proves the ﬁrst part of
















































































t /∂K > ∂ϕL














































































































Together with (ii), this proves the last part of the proposition.

A.3 Proof of proposition 3
First, we proof the following lemma.
Lemma 1. When p < 1,K > 0, we have
λF(ϕ(0)) > pλF(ϕ(1))+(1− p)λF(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
Proof: The second order derivative of ϕ(1) with respect to K is equal to
∂ 2ϕ(1)
∂K2 =






ρ +δ +λ pF(ϕ(1))+λ(1− p)F(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
2
From the ﬁrst order derivative we can derive that ∂ϕ(1)/∂K > −(ρ +δ) and hence














A.4 Proof of proposition 4












41where we drop the subscript t because of the non-existence of time dependence. The ﬁrst order




λ(1− p)(ρ +δ)F(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)




θ(1) = pλF(ϕ(1))+(1− p)λF(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
























ρ +δ +λ pF(ϕ(1))+λ(1− p)F(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
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∂K = 0. This proofs the proposition. 
Proof of Propostion 3























The ﬁrst part at the right hand side of this equation is positive using Proposition XX. The second







Notice that ∂ϕ0(1)/partialδ increases with T. This implies that we restrict ourselves to the






ρ +δ +λ pF(ϕ(1))+λ(1− p)F(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
=
B−ϕ(0)
ρ +δ +λ pF(ϕ(1))+λ(1− p)F(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
+
ϕ(0)−ϕ(1)−λ(1− p)KF(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
ρ +δ +λ pF(ϕ(1))+λ(1− p)F(ϕ(1)+(ρ +δ)K)
<
B−ϕ(0)













which is negative since ∂ϕL
0(1) > 0
43Table A.1 Descriptive statistics for the unemployment spells.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Age 38.33 39.93 42.15 44.47 46.49 47.29 46.44 45.77 45.18 46.73
Female 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.32
Children 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.43
Position in the household
Single 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
Head of household 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.69 0.70 0.68
Partner 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.26
Type of employment
Civil servant 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16
Employed in business sector 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
Self-employed 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08
Regions
Groningen 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07
Friesland 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.16
Drenthe 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04
Overijssel 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13
Flevoland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
Gelderland 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.09
Utrecht 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Noord-Holland 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10
Zuid-Holland 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10
Zeeland 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05
Noord-Brabant 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.14
Limburg 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
Number of observations 19869 10972 6817 4290 2672 1572 825 448 250 135
44Table A.2 Descriptive statistics for the employment spells.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Age 36.29 36.86 36.10 35.80 35.86 36.24 36.80 37.50 38.23 39.37
Female 0.44 0.52 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.54
Children 0.25 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.50
Position in the household
Single 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.00
Head of household 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.00
Partner 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.00
Type of employment
Civil servant 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
Employed in business sector 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
Self-employed 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13
Regions
Groningen 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Friesland 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Drenthe 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Overijssel 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Flevoland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Gelderland 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10
Utrecht 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
Noord-Holland 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.18
Zuid-Holland 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.23
Zeeland 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Noord-Brabant 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.14
Limburg 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07
Number of observations 140082 47008 21298 11480 6730 4272 2819 1955 1172 914
45Table A.3 Numbers and average unemployment durations for the total data set, homeowners and non-
homeowners
Total Homeowner Non-homeowner
number duration number duration number duration
1 48831 26.06 18200 14.63 36631 32.86
2 22897 20.71 9328 15.64 13569 24.19
3 12911 19.01 5551 17.22 7360 20.37
4 7731 19.25 3487 17.65 4244 20.57
5 4610 18.60 2103 16.96 2507 20.18
6 2760 17.29 1276 15.86 1484 18.52
7 1497 16.25 743 14.80 754 14.08
8 852 15.45 434 13.80 418 17.17
9 486 14.80 269 15.01 217 14.54
46Table A.4 Results of the reduced form duration model
Homeowner θL θN θE
Fraction of homeowners 3.991
(0.068)
Homeownership 0.113 − 0.105 − 0.223
(0.022) (0.084) (0.009)
Personal characteristics
Presence of children − 0.057 0.055 0.124 0.371
(0.020) (0.012) (0.039) (0.010)
Female 0.105 − 0.347 0.309 0.232
(0.027) (0.017) (0.056) (0.010)
Higher eduction 0.127 0.023 − 0.977 − 0.020
(0.021) (0.014) (0.066) (0.011)
Age groups (base: below 30)
Between 30 and 40 0.732 − 0.210 − 0.355 − 0.666
(0.025) (0.016) (0.049) (0.011)
Between 40 and 55 0.710 − 0.456 − 1.279 − 0.383
(0.031) (01019) (0.076) (0.018)
55 and over 0.650 − 1.224 − 2.351 0.0207
(0.034) (0.023) (0.104) (0.035)
Position in household (base: spouse of head)
Single − 1.489 − 0.193 0.578) − 0.178
(0.035) (0.026) (0.083) (0.017)
Head of household − 0.289 − 0.145 0.545 − 0.730
(0.024) (0.016) (0.051) (0.012)
Occupation (base: manager and other)
Private sector 0.115 0.077 − 0.796 0.000
(0.029) (0.018) (0.085) (0.034)
Civil servant 0.047 0.031 − 0.706 − 0.005
(0.023) (0.015) (0.074) (0.027)
Self employed 0.126 − 0.030 − 0.627 0.009
(0.039) (0.027) (0.108) (0.038)
47Table A.4 Results of the reduced form duration model (Table continued)
Homeowner θL θN θE
Regions (base: Groningen)
Friesland 0.131 0.1541 − 0.070 0.063
(0.050) (0.040) (0.145) (.033)
Drenthe 0.236 − 0.033 0.232 − 0.058
(0.056) (0.045) (0.146) (0.037)
Overijssel 0.105 0.104 0.143 − 0.042
(0.049) (0.037) (0.126) (0.030)
Flevoland 0.041 0.019 0.533 0.109
(0.090) (0.057) (0.162) (0.041)
Gelderland 0.107 0.095 0.073 − 0.090
(0.044) (0.035) (0.119) (0.028)
Utrecht − 0.032 0.053 0.025 − 0.044
(0.059) (0.040) (0.137) (0.031)
Noord-Holland 0.135 0.018 0.181 0.075
(0.045) (0.034) (0.115) (0.027)
Zuid-Holland 0.183 0.018 0.027 − 0.017
(0.043) (0.033) (0.113) (0.027)
Zeeland 0.194 0.078 0.003 − 0.005
(0.078) (0.047) (0.168) (0.039)
Noord-Brabant 0.190 0.113 0.052 0.001
(0.043) (0.034) (0.115) (0.028)
Limburg 0.111 0.043 − 0.134 0.058
(0.049) (0.037) (0.129) (0.030)
Baseline Hazard
Homeowners
3–6 months 2.059 2.412 2.042
(0.033) (0.211) (0.029)
6–9 months 1.987 3.546 2.098
(0.049) (0.416) (0.031)
9–12 months 4.464 14.448 1.773
(0.125) (1.626) 0.029)
12–15 months 2.741 6.330 4.635
(0.123) (1.677) (0.064)
15–18 months 0.355 2.597 1.220
(0.019) (0.491) (0.018)
Renters
3–6 months 1.810 2.093
(0.031) (0.158)
6–9 months 2.131 4.329
(0.049) (0.376)
9–12 monthsh 4.185 11.743
(0.113) (1.176)
12–15 months (2.051) 5.287
(0.098) (1.202)
15-18 months 0.391 1.584
(0.018) (0.257)
48Table A.4 Results of the reduced form duration model (Table continued)
Homeowner θL θN θE
Mass points
v·,0 − 1.159 0.112 0.004 0.018
(0.052) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
v·,1 − 4.540 0.338 0.034 0.076
(0.061) (0.013) (0.004) (0.002)
Probabilities
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v10,V2 = v20,V3 = v30) 0.137
(0.009)
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v10,V2 = v20,V3 = v30) 0.108
(0.008)
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v11,V2 = v20,V3 = v30) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v11,V2 = v20,V3 = v30) 0.021
(0.017)
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v10,V2 = v21,V3 = v30) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v10,V2 = v21,V3 = v30) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v11,V2 = v21,V3 = v30) 0.200
(0.010)
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v11,V2 = v21,V3 = v30) 0.154
(0.020)
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v10,V2 = v20,V3 = v31) 0.116
(0.008)
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v10,V2 = v20,V3 = v31) 0.122
(0.008)
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v11,V2 = v20,V3 = v31) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v11,V2 = v20,V3 = v31) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v10,V2 = v21,V3 = v31) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v10,V2 = v21,V3 = v31) 0.000
·
P(V0 = v00,V1 = v11,V2 = v21,V3 = v31) 0.074
(0.007)
P(V0 = v01,V1 = v11,V2 = v21,V3 = v31) 0.067
(0.009)
Means of unobserved heterogeneity distributions
E(v·) − 2.757 0.040 0.019 0.040
(− 2.757) (0.040) (0.019) (0.040)
49Table A.5 Correlation coefﬁcients for the unobserved heterogeneity components





v2 0.0525 0.8936 1
(0.0432) (0.0177) ·
v3 -0.0399 -0.2117 -0.1933 1
(0.0428) (0.0679) (0.0660) ·
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50Figure A.2 Reservation wage path for individual workers with parameters: K = 10000, λ = 0.1, p = 0.5, δ = 0.02,
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renters homeowners - local homeowners - non-local
Figure A.3 Levels of U∗ evaluated at different values for λ and with the following parameter values: K = 10000,
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